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In 1906 there occurred a rebellion among a part of the indigenous people against the settler 
government  of  the  British  colony  of  Natal,  ostensibly  against  the  collection  of  a  poll 
(capitation) tax on adult males.  It is very often called the Zulu Rebellion, but it has many 
names, and it is commonly called “Bhambatha’s rebellion” or “the Bhambatha rebellion”, 
after the most famous of its leaders.76  The centenary of the rebellion was marked by public 
celebrations of a political character which however shed very little light on the actual historic 
events.   
These  celebrations  were  sponsored  by  the  provincial  government,  usually  in 
collaboration  with  ad  hoc  local  bodies.   They  commenced  when  the  provincial  premier 
announced that Bhambatha would be posthumously reinstalled as a chief.  There followed the 
laying of wreaths at memorials at Mpanza, near Greytown on 8 April 2006, followed by a 
cleansing ceremony and the dedication of a memorial wall to the “Richmond Twelve” on 22 
April. They culminated in the laying of more wreaths and the reinstatement of Bhambatha to 
his chieftaincy at Mpanza on 11 June.  
The latter affair also engaged the national government, and the crowded programme 
included speeches by the president and deputy president, as well as provincial premier, the 
chairperson of the House of Traditional Leaders and the king of the Zulu nation.  A special 
postage stamp was issued to mark the occasion.  Almost a week later, on 16 June or Youth 
76 It has also been called the Natal Rebellion, the Natal Native Rebellion, the Poll Tax Rebellion, the Poll Tax 
Uprising, the Zulu Uprising, and the War of the Heads.
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Day, a Bhambatha Memorial Concert took place at Lake Merthley, also near Greytown.77  On 
27 September Bhambatha was awarded the national Order of Mendi in Gold for Bravery.78
Outside the government  sphere there was very little  to mark the centenary.   Two 
plays, which did not enjoy government support, hardly got off the ground.79   A third, which 
did, was the musical  1906 Bhambada–The Freedom Fighter,  which ran for a fortnight in 
Pietermaritzburg, and was touted to go on to Pretoria, but did not, probably for political as 
well as aesthetic reasons.80 A government-funded Indigenous Knowledge Systems project by 
local university academics produced a book entitled Freedom Sown in Blood: Memories of  
the  Impi  Yamakhanda, which  contained  practically  nothing  about  the  rebellion  itself.81 
Another book, Remembering the Rebellion: The Zulu Uprising of 1906, comprised a series of 
twelve  commemorative  supplements  previously published in  the  The Witness and related 
newspapers  in  partnership  with  the  provincial  department  of  education.   Beautifully 
illustrated and pitched at schools, it necessarily simplified scholarship on the rebellion for its 
readers.82
77 Among the more informative public statements are: KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government and Republic of 
South Africa,  Department  of  Arts and Culture,  Age of  Hope: Through Struggle to  Freedom: Saluting our 
Heroes. Reinstating Inkosi Bhambatha (Pietermaritzburg, Office of the Premier, 2006); KwaZulu-Natal, Office 
of the Premier, Bhambatha Centenary Committee,  Saluting our Heroes and Celebrating our Rich Heritage in  
KwaZulu-Natal  2006 (Pietermaritzburg,  Office  of  the  Premier,  2006);  KwaZulu-Natal  Celebrating  Youth 
Heroism & Activism 2006 (Pietermaritzburg: Office of the Premier and Youth Commission, 2006); The Daily 
News, “Bhambatha reinstated”, 9 June 2006; and The Witness, “100 Years of Bhambatha Poll Tax Uprising” 
[advertisement], 15 June 2006.  See also the press reports in the Ilovu News, “Old Enemies Bring Closure to the 
Past  in  Richmond”,  April  2006;  and  The  Witness,  “Bhambatha  Reinstated”,  6  February  2006;  “Memorial 
Reconciles”,  24  April  2006;  “SA  Post  Office  to  issue  Bhambatha  Rebellion  Stamp”,  26  May  2006; 
“Preparations Fit for an Inkosi”, 6 June 2006; “Mbeki Hails Great Hero Bhambatha”, 12 June 2006;  Witness 
Echo, “Comrades, Hands off June 16”, 19 June 2006 and “Youth gets into Parliament”, 22 June 2006; and The 
Sowetan, “Rivals Stand United”, 12 June 2006.  Several activities based upon ambitions of various local groups 
and scheduled early on appear not to have transpired; see the Bhambatha Centenary Committee’s Saluting Our 
Heroes and “Khandampondo 1906-2006” (7 page typescript, [April] 2006); and Office of the Premier, “Saluting 
our  Heroes  and Celebrating  our Rich Heritage  in  KwaZulu-Natal”,  supplement  in  The Sunday Tribune 24 
September 2006 and The Mercury 25 September 2006.
78 The Witness, “Mbeki Honours KZN’s Greatest with National Orders”, 27 September 2006.
79 See The Mercury, Goodlife supplement, “War, Song and Dance”, 10 November 2006, and “Out of Africa”, 15 
December  2006;  The Witness,  “Bhambatha  Musical  Celebrates  the Centenary  of the Uprisings”,  30 March 
2006; and Witness Echo, “Musical about Love and War”, 21 December 2006.
80 See and cf. The Mercury, “Premier’s Office Spent R7m on Bhambatha Play”, 23 February 2007; The Sunday 
Tribune, “Bhambatha Cash Bonanza”, 11 June 2006; and The Witness, “The Long Journey of Stroppy Ngema”, 
11  November  2006;  “Edutainment  at  Winston  [sic]  Theatre”,  16  November  2006;  “When  Drama,  Dance 
Obscure the Facts”, 2 December 2006; “Ngema’s Piece of Singing, Dancing History”, 5 December 2006.
81 Thenjiwe Magwaza, Yonah Seleti, and Mpilo Pearl Sithole, eds., Freedom Sown in Blood: Memories of the  
Impi Yamakhanda: An Indigenous Knowledge Systems Perspective (Thohoyondou: Ditlou, 2006).
82 Jeff Guy, Remembering the Rebellion: The Zulu Uprising of 1906  (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-
Natal  Press, 2006). See  The Witness, “Premier Launches Bhambatha Rebellion Centenary Year”,  16 March 
2006, and the twelve supplements which appeared 16 March – 13 July 2006.
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The events and productions of the centenary, reflecting the interests of the current 
dispensation,  glorified  Bhambatha,  but  added  little,  in  an  academic  sense,  to  a  real 
understanding of the rebellion.  The rebellion has been characterized as the opening shot of 
the South African struggle for liberation from colonialism, imperialism and apartheid, and 
Bhambatha  as  the  torchbearer  of  the  movement.83  It  is  remarkable  that  an  event,  now 
officially described as an important watershed in South African history, has received so little 
scholarly attention.84  Indeed relatively little had been written and published about it and few 
works were generally available at the time of the centenary.85  This deficiency may account 
83 See and cf. The Mercury, “Mbeki, Zuma share the stage”, 12 June 2006, and “A common tryst with destiny”, 
5  October  2006;  The  Sowetan,  “Rivals  stand  united”,  12  June  2006;  Umphithi  [Msunduzi  Municipality 
newspaper], “Premier Upbeat about KwaZulu-Natal”, February 2006; The Witness, “An Event to Remember”, 
16 March 2006; “Rewriting History”, 27 March 2006 and “Remembering the Bhambatha Rebellion”, 10 April 
2006.
84 Notably falling through the cracks was the provincial government’s International Bhambatha Colloquium to 
be held in October 2006, in partnership with the national Department of Arts and Culture.
85 The books by Stuart and Marks (see below) have long been out of print, as are Walter Bosman, The Natal  
Rebellion  of  1906 (London  and  Cape  Town:  Longmans,  Green,  and  C.  T.  Juta,  1907)  and  C.  T.  Binns, 
Dinuzulu: The Death of  the House of Shaka (London: Longmans, 1968).   The printed documents were,  of 
course, once-off publications: see Colony of Natal, The Natal Native Rebellion as Told in Official Despatches  
from January 1st to June 23rd, 1906 (Pietermaritzburg: Davis, 1906)—cited hereafter as OD—and also printed in 
The Natal Government Gazette, No. 3568A, 2 October 1906; Report of Native Affairs Commission 1906-7 and 
the accompanying  Evidence (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1907); and  The Trial of Dinuzulu on Charges of High  
Treason  at  Greytown,  Natal,  1908-09 (Pietermaritzburg:  “Times”,  1910).  Lars  Berge,  The  Bambatha 
Watershed: Swedish Missionaries,  African Churches and an Evolving Church in Rural Natal and Zululand 
1902-1910 (Uppsala:  Swedish  Institute  of  Missionary  Research,  2000),  is  tangential  and  has  little  on  the 
rebellion itself, and Andreas Z. Zungu,  uSukabhekuluma and the Bhambatha Rebellion (translated from the 
1933 edition by A.  C.  T.  Mayekiso,  Durban:  CSSALL, 1997)  is  an  entertaining mix of  reminiscence  and 
imagination.  Neither seems to have enjoyed wide circulation.  Similarly, P. S. Thompson, An Historical Atlas 
of  the  Zulu  Rebellion  of  1906 (Pietermaritzburg:  2001);  Bambatha  at  Mpanza:  The  Making  of  a  Rebel  
(Pietermaritzburg: 2004); and Incident at Trewirgie: First Shots of the Zulu Rebellion 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, 
2005), are private publications and rank as samizdat.  The books by Benedict Carton and John Lambert are 
discussed below. There were a fair number of articles on the subject, although they appeared in academic or 
parochial journals with limited circulations.  Benjamin Colenbrander, “An Account of the Zulu Rebellion of 
1906”,  Natalia 35, 2005, 10-28, is the report  of the Magistrate of the Nkandhla Division in Zululand. The 
currently  accepted  spelling  is  Nkandla.  Deriving  from  her  book  Reluctant  Rebellion:  The  1906-1908 
Disturbances in Natal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) are Shula Marks’s, “Class, Ideology and the Bambatha 
Rebellion”, in Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa, ed. Donald Crummey (London: Currey, 1986), 
351-72, and “The Zulu Disturbances in Natal”, in Protest and Power in Black Africa, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and 
Ali A. Mazrui  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 213-57.  See also Ken Gillings, “The Bambata 
Rebellion  of  1906:  Nkandla  Operations  and  the  Battle  of  Mome Gorge,  10  June  1906”,  Military  History 
Journal 8, no. 1, June 1989, 21-31, and “The ‘death’ of Bhambatha Zondi: A Recent Discovery”,  Military 
History Journal  12, no. 4, December 2002, 133-37; Sean Redding, “A Blood-Stained Tax: Poll Tax and the 
Bambatha Rebellion in South Africa”,  African Studies Review 43, no. 2, September 2000, 29-54; and P. S. 
Thompson, “Isandlwana to Mome: Zulu Experience in Overt  Resistance to Colonial  Rule”,  Soldiers of  the 
Queen 77, June 1994, 11-15; “Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion”, Natalia 33, 2003, 59-66; “Bambatha’s Rebels: 
a Profile–Age, Faction, Motive”, Historia 48, no. 2, November 2003, 98-108; and “The Zulu Rebellion of 1906: 
The Collusion of Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, International Journal of African Historical Studies 36, no. 3, 2003, 
533-57.
34  BHAMBATHA AND THE ZULU REBELLION
in part for the disagreement over what to name the rebellion, if indeed it was a rebellion,86 
and even how to spell Bhambatha’s name.87
The chronology of events is well known.  First, in February and March 1906, there 
was a bloody incident between police and poll tax protesters followed by a repressive militia 
demonstration in the southern part of the colony.  Second, there was Bhambatha’s rebellion 
at Mpanza in April, which moved to the Nkandla district in Zululand and flourished until it 
was crushed by militia early in June.  Third, late in June there was a disorganized uprising 
among several chieftaincies in the Maphumulo district which the militia suppressed in July.
It is generally agreed that the immediate cause of the rebellion was the government’s 
attempt to collect the new poll tax of £1 on all adult males (with the exemption of certain 
important categories), which fell most heavily on the indigenous population in a period of 
economic depression.  Yet beyond this there is disagreement over basic or underlying factors. 
James  Stuart,  a  participant,  saw an  inevitable  clash  between  civilization  and  savagery.88 
Shula Marks, writing almost sixty years afterwards, saw in it the complexities of secondary 
resistance to colonialism,89 and John Lambert, Benedict Carton, Sean Redding, and Jeff Guy, 
while focusing on particular aspects have written within the same ambit twenty-some years 
later.90
James Stuart’s History of Bhambatha’s Rebellion
86 Mpilo Pearl Sithole, “‘Rebellion’ or Uprising?: A Reinterpretation of Impi Yamakhanda”, in Freedom Sown 
in Blood, chapter 4. 
87 The spelling has changed in conformance with changes in Zulu orthography and thus Bambata, Bambatha, 
and Bhambatha, paralleled by Bambada and Bhambada, and latterly even Bhambhata and Bhambhatha.
88 James Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion 1906 and of Dinuzulu’s Arrest, Trial and Expatriation (London: 
Macmillan, 1913), 517.
89 Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-1908 Disturbances in Natal, xviii-xxv.
90 John Lambert,  Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal (Pietermaritzburg:  University of 
Natal  Press,  1995)  describes  the  progressive  extension  and  abuse  of  power  by  the  colonial  state,  which, 
combined with natural disasters, were undermining as well as reshaping traditional African society, so that a 
violent reaction of some sort seemed practically inevitable. Benedict Carton,  Blood from Your Children: The 
Colonial Origins of Generational Conflict in South Africa  (Pietermaritzburg:  University of Natal Press, and 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000) focuses on the younger generations’ challenging patriarchal 
authority in changed economic circumstances, which culminated in the rebellion.  Sean Redding, “Governing 
the Zulu by Killing Them: Poll Tax and the Bambatha Rebellion in Natal and Zululand”, chapter 4 in Sorcery 
and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880-1963 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, 2006), looks at the ways in which the rebels conceptualized and justified their acts in accordance with 
traditional  religious beliefs.   In addition to  Remembering the Rebellion Jeff Guy is also the author of  The 
Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-
Natal Press, 2005), which trains more narrowly on a group of chieftaincies in the coastal district which were 
peculiarly susceptible to rebellion because of their internal problems.  
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Little of a factual nature was known about Bhambatha.  At the time of the centenary the only 
credible biographical source was James Stuart’s History of the Zulu Rebellion, published in 
1913.  Stuart was a civil servant and Zulu linguist who had held a number of magisterial 
posts.   He was  an  intelligence  officer  in  the  militia  during  the  rebellion.   Much  of  his 
information came from personal acquaintance with those who knew Bhambatha and who had 
been directly involved in the rebellion. He was Secretary of the Native Affairs Commission 
which  in  1906-1907  sought  out  the  causes  of  the  rebellion  and  proposed  a  remedy  of 
grievances.   He had access  to military reports.   He was involved in the preliminaries  of 
Dinuzulu’s treason trial and took statements from Bhambatha’s wife, Siyekiwe, and others.91 
Stuart’s account of Bhambatha is sympathetic, but never approving. His Bhambatha 
is  a  driven man and an  irresponsible  chief,  vicious  in  habits  and volatile  in  disposition, 
deeply in debt to landlords and distrusted by the government. “A more perturbed spirit than 
he was at the close of 1905 it is scarcely possible to conceive”. Bhambatha was deposed as 
chief by the government, not for leading his people to resist the poll tax, but for failing to 
report, as was his duty, a group of them which had armed to resist it – and which he had 
dissuaded from doing so!  Summoned to  explain himself,  he escaped arrest,  and fled to 
Zululand with his favourite wife and three children.  He was already bent on rebellion, and 
91 Stuart is perhaps better known today for his collection of information, which has recently been published in 
Colin B. Webb and John B. Wright, eds. The James Stuart Archives of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the  
History of  the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples,  6 vols.  (Pietermaritzburg,  University of Natal  Press,  1976-
2001).  Stuart’s career in the colonial civil service is given in the Colony of Natal,  Natal Civil Service List,  
1909 (Pietermaritzburg,  Davis,  1909),  232.  Shortly  after  the outbreak  of the rebellion he was seconded to 
Greytown  as  Intelligence  Officer  and  made  a  daring  trip  (21-23  April)  to  the  Nkandla  magistracy  in  the 
company of Funizwe and others for the purpose of identifying Bhambatha when Bhambatha’s capture seemed 
imminent (Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 258).  He remained at the magistracy until early May when he returned to 
Natal and was attached with Colonel Mackay’s column, which operated in the Umsinga and Nqutu divisions. 
In his report Mackay states: “Capt. Stuart rendered invaluable assistance to my column as Intelligence Officer. 
He  was  indefatigable  in  the  prosecution  of  his  enquiries  and  his  information  was  invariably  correct,  and 
absolutely to be depended [upon].  His most extreme knowledge of natives, their history, habits, customs, and 
language peculiarly fitted him for such a position.  Should an Intelligence Officer be appointed to the permanent 
staff  no more  suitable  officer  could be  found for  the  work”.  See Colonial  Secretary’s  Office  (CSO) 2599 
C147/1906.  Sir  Charles  Saunders,  then  Commissioner  for  Native  Affairs  in  Zululand,  was  not  quite  so 
generous.  He wrote to the magistrate at Nqutu just after Mome: “I saw a good deal of James Stuart, and quite 
agree with your opinion about him.  I found exactly the same in all I had to do with him at Nkandhla; as you 
say, he is a very good chap, but I think this business is a little beyond him”. (Saunders to C. Hignett, 14 June 
1906, in the Archives of Zululand–hereafter ZA 28). For Stuart’s appointment as a secretary of the Natal Native 
Affairs Commission, see  Report of the Native Affairs Commission 1906-7, 54; and for his access to military 
reports, “List of Official Papers Returned to Under Secretary for Defence, Pretoria, by Capt. J. Stuart, N.F.A. on 
7 June 1913”, in CSO, 2599 C147/1906.  The depositions are in the records of the Attorney General’s Office 
(AGO) I/7/61. All official documents are in the Pietermaritzburg repository of the KwaZulu-Natal Archives, 
unless otherwise stated.   
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apparently was called to the Osuthu by Dinuzulu and was given a Mauser rifle and told him 
to go back to Natal and start the rebellion.  Accompanied by two escorts from Usuthu he did 
just that. He reclaimed his chieftaincy by force, attacked the magistrate and then the police, 
but  finding  no  support  among  his  fellow  chiefs,  he  escaped  capture  again  and  fled  to 
Zululand  with  his  following.  Here  he  found  sanctuary  in  the  Nkandla  forest  under  the 
protection of the aged chief Sigananda.  Sigananda accepted him as Dinuzulu’s man, and 
joined the rebellion, bringing over most of his own tribe and many from others.  Bhambatha 
was a leader of importance in the rebel army until the battle of Bhobe, at which his special 
medicine to deflect white men’s bullets proved ineffectual.  He later visited Usuthu in the 
company of the rebel leader Mangathi and had another interview with Dinuzulu, after which 
he rejoined the rebels, and soon afterwards was killed along with many others in action at the 
Mhome Gorge.  He could have saved himself and his men by heeding reports of imminent 
entrapment by the militia, but he did not.92
A New History, based on the Colonial Records
Stuart’s biography describes Bhambatha’s career in detail up to and including the outbreak of 
the rebellion, but it is relatively sketchy on it afterwards.93 In its broad outline and many of its 
details Stuart’s biography of Bhambatha still appears to be correct, but since Stuart’s time 
many official documents concerning Bhambatha in the rebellion which were not accessible to 
him have become accessible to the public in the Pietermaritzburg repository of the KwaZulu-
Natal Archives.  Shula Marks made good use of them, and, since she wrote, still more have 
become available.  
Today’s scholar can assay a new biography of Bhambatha, and the purpose of this 
article is to do just that. The biography which follows supersedes Stuart’s, but only in part. It 
adds to and corrects parts of his account, but largely confirms and incorporates much of his 
information.  The thesis is that Bhambatha was not a strong leader, but in fact a weak one, 
92 See Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 157-97 passim, and 202, 212, 228, 235-37, 310, 313.  The quotation is on 159. 
The term “tribe” is a contemporary term which cannot be dispensed with in this context.
93 The citations in the preceding note after passim are the only ones which pertain to Bhambatha’s career from 
late April to early June 1906.   When Mackay’s column left the Nkandla magistracy on 11 May Stuart was 
removed from the theatre in which Bhambatha operated.  
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who had to be looked after (or “managed”) much of the time by stronger personalities such as 
Sukabhekuluma and Mangathi.  The enemy spoke of “Bhambatha’s rebellion” and used his 
name to identify all manner of agents in the course of operations; but in truth Bhambatha 
exercised practically  no control  over operations  at  all.   His glorification  today is  a great 
irony.
Official  records  pertaining  to  the  rebellion  are  plentiful  and  yield  a  variety  of 
evidence, some of it quite conflicting. What motivates one chief to rebel, another to stand by 
the government, and yet another to “chew with both jaws”? What is the role of the Zulu king 
Dinuzulu,  who appears to support  both sides,  albeit  in different  ways at  different  times? 
There is no agreement in the evidence, which is off-putting for those, such as the politicians 
of the centenary who want to know the mainspring of rebellion and to categorize men and 
their deeds simply and easily.
This account of Bhambatha’s career is based upon colonial sources, i.e. the writings 
and publications of whites in the Colony of Natal bearing on and usually contemporary with 
the  relevant  events.  For  the  most  part  they  were  recorded  by  government  and  military 
authorities, and are based on observations, direct and indirect reports, and hearsay (as in the 
case of the James Stuart Archive). The colonial records comprise official correspondence and 
reports of all sorts, newspaper reports, legal declarations and statements, diaries and journals, 
and  trial  records.   Contemporary  records  are  often  better  for  dating  and placing  events. 
Subsequent records often afford more analysis and detail.  While, of course, colonial records 
may be considered vitiated by their very character, their bias does not necessarily mean they 
cannot be accurate.  The men who wrote them usually were motivated by a desire to know 
what was actually happening so that they could act accordingly, and they would defeat their 
own purposes by deliberately covering up or distorting events.  There are instances of their 
misunderstanding and misinterpreting events, but rarely of their dissembling.
There is a significant difference between court and other records. Objective truth is 
subordinated to a partisan quest for a verdict. In this article much use is made of the records 
of  the  trials  of  the  so-called  rebels  –  courts  martial  and  magistrates’  courts  trials  under 
martial law, and, of course, the Special Court which tried Dinuzulu (and Sukabhekuluma) for 
high treason.94  The character and value of the evidence vary greatly in all these sources. Jeff 
94 The official documents pertaining to and the transcripts of the trials of Dinuzulu and Sukabhekuluma (called 
Cakijana in these cases), 1908–1909 appear in the records of the Registrar of the Supreme Court (RSC) III/3, 
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Guy has pointed this out very well in respect of those he used for The Maphumulo Uprising, 
although he is rather too severe in his strictures on colonial bona fides and methods.95 In any 
case, the selection and evaluation of evidence from these sources depend on the knowledge, 
experience  and judgement  of  the  investigating  scholar.   Does  he  prefer  the  word  of  the 
prosecution  or  of  the  defence  in  a  given  instance?   What  is  to  be  made  of  absolutely 
contradictory statements, such as appear in Rex vs Dinuzulu? The evidence has to be sifted, 
compared, weighed, and set against other evidence from outside the court.  It will be argued 
that the scholar’s own bias will come into play.  Indeed, it will, but so should the scholar’s 
self-awareness allow for its correction.
An Alternative History, Based on Indigenous Orality
The  critical  reader  who thinks  that  Bhambatha  and the  rebellion  will  be  misrepresented 
through the use of colonial records naturally will want to know what alternative records are 
available which would redress the balance of perspective.  These alternative records consist 
almost entirely of the reports of persons who lived at the time of the rebellion or heard about 
it  from those who did, some of whom were participants. These have been transmitted by 
word of mouth, and therefore may be categorized as Oral History.  Many historical records 
have  their  origins  in  oral  history,  but  once  recorded  they  become  subject  to  a  different 
methodological scrutiny.  
Oral history is closely allied to, indeed, may be considered an adjunct to Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (IKS), which seek in part to divorce the vitiating European or colonial 
influences.  IKS is very popular with scholars seeking an alternative to colonial documents, 
but the collection of oral history has not always embraced the same methodology required for 
documentary history.  In order to be usable it must be written down, and so it finally becomes 
susceptible to that methodological rigour.
The Special Court: Zulu Rebellion, and AGO I/7/51–81, “Zulu Rebellion”.  The records of the courts martial 
appear in Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) I/6/26–28, Native Rebellion, 1906: Court Martial Proceedings. 
The records of trials under martial law appear in the martial law case books, variously entitled, in the archives 
of the magistrates,  most notably in this instance 1/GTN 1/3/2/1, 1/KRK 1/4/1/1, and 1/NKA 1/5/1/1–2, for 
Greytown,  Kranskop and  Nkandla,  respectively.  All  these  documents  are  in  the Pietermaritzburg  Archives 
Repository.
95 Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising, 119-26.
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Court records may be regarded as a type of oral history, which is recorded as soon as 
possible and therefore is very useful; but sometimes the recording of oral history comes too 
late.  In the collection of the Oral History Project (1983) at the Killie Campbell Africana 
Library  are  six interviews  with old men who speak of  the rebellion  with some personal 
knowledge.   Some of  them tell  interesting  stories,  but  they  are  fantastic  and  cannot  be 
correlated with contemporary documentation.
There are two publications (apart from Stuart’s) of oral history which do have an 
important  bearing  on Bhambatha.   Magema Fuze’s  The Black  People  and Whence They  
Came:  A  Zulu  View,  originally  published  in  1922,  contains  three  chapters  (64–66)  on 
Bhambatha and the rebellion.96  The information evidently comes from contemporary but 
unidentified informants, and unfortunately it is badly organized and the account is confused. 
Andreas Zungu’s  USukabhekuluma and the Bhambatha Rebellion,  originally published in 
1933,  records  the  reminiscences  of  Sukabhekuluma  a  quarter  of  a  century  afterwards.97 
There is a wealth of detail in the fast-paced narrative, but much of it is obviously distorted 
and  incorrect,  which  casts  doubt  on  the  rest.  The  scholar  must  make  reference  to  the 
reminiscences, but cannot place much reliance on them. The critical reader would do well to 
compare it with the consolidated statements of Sukabhekuluma taken at Kranskop in May 
1908.98  
The  most  important  recent  work  using  oral  history  is  Freedom  Sown  in  Blood:  
Memories of the Impi Yamakhanda: An Indigenous Knowledge System Perspective edited by 
Thenjiwe Magwaza, Yonah Seleti and Mpilo Pearl Sithole. This is the fruit of an IKS project 
at Ngome in 2003–2005. It contains some interesting material, but scarcely anything about 
the rebellion itself.  In this respect it represents a missed opportunity.  Intensive interviews 
with seventeen men who talked about the rebellion are omitted (and the author has not been 
able to find out where the transcripts are). There is a contentious genealogy of Bhambatha, 
but otherwise little is said about him. The book does contain extracts from three  izibongo 
(praise songs), two apparently recorded by James Stuart and Andreas Zungu some time ago, 
96  Magema Fuze, The Black People and Whence They Came: A Zulu View, translated by H. C. Lugg and edited 
by A. T. Cope (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press and Killie Campbell Africana Library: 1979). The 
first edition was published in 1922.
97  Andreas Zungu, USukabhekuluma and the Bhambatha Rebellion, translated by A. C. T. Mayekiso (Durban: 
CSSALL, 1997). First edition: 1933.
98 This appears in AGO I/7/68, “Resume”, 20 May 1908.
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and the third during the project by the present Zondi  imbongi Ngoni Ndlovu. (It is curious 
that  another  isibongo,  in Zungu’s book, which is more like Stuart’s  in content and quite 
different from the one in Magwaza et al, has been omitted.)  The three izibongo give more or 
less the same information and this approximates (but only approximates) attested information 
in colonial records. They do not make up a particularly flattering biography of Bhambatha. 
They mention his swiftness as a runner, his viciousness in hitting people with a stick, his 
taking cattle from white farmers, and his being at odds with chiefs loyal to the government. 
Zungu  and  Ndlovu  mention  his  being  summoned  by  the  authorities  to  Greytown,  the 
immunizing medicine  and  the fight with the police, his flight to Zululand, and, oddly, his 
desire to return to Natal and his followers’ refusal to do so, and his escape to Mozambique. 
This is the best we get from oral history here. There is nothing that fundamentally contradicts 
a colonial-based account, except the later accretion about escaping to Mozambique. 
There are also cases of writers of fiction who claim to make use of oral history. The 
problems  with  telling  a  good  story  are  illuminated  in  several  chapters  of  the  recently 
published  Zulu Identities:  Being  Zulu,  Past  and Present.99 In  this  2008 publication,  Dan 
Wylie (chapter 7) and John Wright (chapter 6) have little use for such fictive truth, whereas 
Sifiso Ndlovu is more accommodating (chapters 9 and 10), while Jabulani Sithole (chapter 
27) and Nsizwa Dlamini (chapter 32) appear to occupy an intermediate position. Whatever 
gems of fact may be embedded in Rolfes Dhlomo’s Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo (1968) and Elliot 
Zondi’s  Insumansumane (1986),  these  works  are  still  fiction.100  Similarly  the  centenary 
plays.  Historical fiction does depend on some historical fact, but it is derivative, and for that 
reason it is untrustworthy as a source.
The critical  reader will  gather  from the above that the alternative sources are not 
sufficient  to  provide  a  detailed  history  of  Bhambatha’s  career  or  the  rebellion.   The 
centenarists who have glorified Bhambatha have done so in a few words.  If they rely on the 
alternative history they cannot do otherwise. Only the colonial records provide a coherent, 
detailed narrative.
99  Benedict  Carton, John Laband and Jabulani Sithole,  eds.,  Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present 
(Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).
100 Rolfes  Dhlomo,  Dinuzulu  kaCetshwayo (Pietermaritzburg,  Shuter  &  Shooter,  1968)  and  Elliot  Zondi, 
Insumansumane (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1986).
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The Troubled Chief
Bhambatha was born circa 1865, the son of Mancinza (also called Sobhuza) kaJangeni by his 
chief wife. Mancinza was the chief of the Zondi tribe and resided with the branch of it at 
Ngome, in that part of the Colony of Natal demarcated as the Umvoti Division.  Mancinza 
died in 1883, and his brothers Zikwazi and Magwababa were successive regents for his son 
Bhambatha, who acceded to the chieftaincy in 1890, when he was deemed of age by both the 
tribal  elders  and  the  colonial  government.  Any  leader  would  have  found  the  Ngome 
chieftaincy challenging.  The people lived on farms owned chiefly by Boer settlers.   The 
population grew, but their agricultural techniques remained limited. They struggled to pay 
their rents and fell into poverty. Rinderpest and the South African War added to their misery. 
It is not clear from the records whether or not members working off their location provided 
sufficient income to ease the situation.  Bhambatha sought in vain to get more land for his 
people  by making claims on that  of  the neighbouring Bomvu tribe.  Early  in  the war he 
claimed the Boer landlords were disloyal and were trying to evict his people because they 
were loyal to the Crown.  In 1902 and again in 1905 he asked the government if his people 
could be relocated to Zululand.101
Like  his  father,  Bhambatha  had  a  chequered  career  in  marriage.  His  first  wife, 
Mamqayana,  bore him three children,  but they parted after  she committed adultery.   His 
second wife, Magogotshwana, left him.  He sought a third wife, but could not afford the bride 
price; they were not married, though she bore him a son, who was later murdered. Finally he 
married  a  twin  against  the  elders’  advice.   This  was  Masikonyana,  better  known in  the 
101 Thompson,  Bambatha at Mpanza,  8-16 passim; cf. Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion,  157-59 and Marks,  Reluctant 
Rebellion, 201.  These three books, which are all out of print and of limited availability (only 200 copies of 
Thompson’s were  printed,  of which a third went to provincial  school libraries),  cover  the background and 
outbreak of the rebellion at Mpanza in varying detail and perspective. Because of this relative inaccessibility 
their common story of the outbreak is given at greater length here than otherwise would be warranted.  Also, 
they are referred to separately in the notes for convenience of comparison. (In this and notes for this and the 
next two sections, the three sources are contradistinguished by “cf.” in order, for the convenience of the reader, 
to indicate the “new” and “old” information.) On genealogy see “Bhambatha’s Family Tree: Oral evidence, new 
and old” in  Natalia, 38 (December), 2008. On landlords and evictions see Johan Wassermann, “‘Sowing the 
Seeds of Rebellion’: Chief Bhambatha kaMancinza and the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902”, African Historical  
Review 39, no. 2, 2007, 91-106.  According to the 1904 census the abaseNgome had 1547 males and 850 huts. 
It was of medium size demographically, the third largest tribe in the division, although it had only half the 
number of men of the largest tribe in the division.  It was dwarfed by comparison with the largest tribes in Natal 
and Zululand, e.g. the amaChunu in the Weenen and amaChube in the Nkandla divisions. See Colony of Natal, 
Census of the Colony of Natal April, 1904 (Pietermaritzburg: Davis, 1905), 281; and cf. Ministerial Department 
of Native Affairs, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904 (Pietermaritzburg, “Times”, 1904), 147-48.
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literature as Siyekiwe, by whom he had two children. She was his favourite wife.  She was 
pregnant  again in late 1905, and he had a homestead (which he called “the place of the 
spear”) constructed just for the two of them.  Her children were sent to her father’s place and 
the three children of his first wife were brought to attend them.102
Bhambatha was also plagued by money difficulties.  He was a party in thirty-six cases 
for debt, although he seems to have appeared in court in only about half of them. He was 
imprisoned briefly in 1892, and suspended as chief on charges of cattle stealing in 1894-
1895, but got off when several witnesses perjured themselves. He was fined for cruelty to 
animals in 1896. In 1902 he was gravely ill, and in 1903 spent a long time with his uncle 
Nongamulana, the chief of the amaZondi living in the Nkandhla Division. After the war he 
was imprisoned for short periods four times for debt. He was fined for seduction, trespass, 
contempt of court, and not removing burr weed. He was reprimanded by the magistrate for 
failing to take action to prevent two faction fights, and there probably were many more which 
he did not prevent, and in August 1905 he was a leading participant in one, in which he 
struck down several men with his stick and ordered his followers to “finish” them. This was 
the last straw for the magistrate and for the department of Native Affairs.  No other chief had 
such a bad record.  The government decided to depose him as chief. The Governor signed the 
order on 23 February 1906.  
The abaseNgome had two or three factions. One lived in the Mpanza valley, and they 
supported Bhambatha through thick and thin.  Another lived in the Loza valley, and they 
looked to Bhambatha’s uncle, Magwababa, who had been regent during his minority.  The 
possible third faction, about which little is known, lived in the Nsundu valley to the East.103  
Bhambatha did not lead his people to resist the poll tax, although he and they, like all 
the other Africans in the Colony, bitterly resented it. It was a portion of the Mpanza faction 
that armed and headed towards Greytown with a view to defy (and quite possibly to attack) 
the magistrate on 22 February. Bhambatha headed them off and persuaded them not to, and 
they  went  home;  but  they  got  close  enough  to  Greytown  for  a  rumour  to  spread  that 
Bhambatha and his men were going to attack the town that night. There was a scare and the 
settler community went into laager against an attack.  Bhambatha should have reported what 
102 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 16-17.  Cf. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 158.
103 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 11-12, 15-17, 20-25, 44; and “Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion”, 61-62. Cf. 
Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 159-60, and Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 202. 
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the Mpanza men had done, but he did not. The government had already decided to depose 
him, but they wanted an explanation of this latest development as well.  They were sensitive 
to legal niceties, perhaps the more so because the Colony was under martial law as a result of 
the  incident  near  Richmond.   Bhambatha  was  summoned  to  Pietermaritzburg.   He  was 
promised safe passage, but Bhambatha and his supporters did not trust the government. He 
said he would go, then, persuaded by Mpanza men, he decided not to go. A detachment of 
police and militia went to get him on 9 March, but he eluded them.104
Recourse to Dinuzulu
At this juncture Bhambatha went to the Osuthu, the great place of the Usuthu chief Dinuzulu 
kaCetshwayo. Dinuzulu was widely regarded and treated as the king in Zululand and as such 
respected in Natal as well. Indeed, he had been king until he resisted British annexation of 
Zululand in 1888, and for his “rebellion” against the British crown he had been deposed and 
exiled to St. Helena.   He had returned ten years later  as part  of the agreement by which 
Zululand was annexed as a province to the Colony of Natal, but officially he was only the 
chief of the Usuthu tribe, in the Ndwandwe Division. In so far as the colonial authorities let 
him,  because  they could  not  really  stop him,  he assumed a  regal  posture  socially  if  not 
politically.  He received fealty from many of his former subjects, and may well have nurtured 
ambitions  to  retrieve  his  former  glory.  Rumours  circulated  of  his  restoration  and  the 
extirpation of the settler regime, especially just prior to the rebellion.  Yet he set an example 
of loyalty by having his own people pay the poll tax early.105
Why did Bhambatha go to Dinuzulu? According to Dinuzulu he came unbidden to 
ask for a place to live, free of the impositions of white landlords.  This Dinuzulu could not 
give him, and sent him home.  As he was about to leave, Bhambatha saw that Dinuzulu was 
ill, and said that his tribe had a great doctor who could cure him.  Dinuzulu arranged to have 
two men accompany Bhambatha back to Natal in order to fetch this doctor.106 He had a ready 
explanation for Bhambatha’s unseemly behaviour after he left the Osuthu: Bhambatha was 
104 Thompson,  Bambatha at Mpanza, 27-52 passim, and “Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion”, 60-61. Cf. Stuart, 
Zulu Rebellion, 161-66, and Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 203-04.
105 Thompson,  Bambatha at  Mpanza,  55-56, and “Bambatha’s Personal  Rebellion”,  59-60. Cf. Stuart,  Zulu 
Rebellion, 109-118.  For Dinuzulu’s career after 1884, especially see Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 89-116.
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mad.107  According to Bhambatha’s wife and children he was summoned to the Osuthu by 
one of these men.  He did want a place to live, but he did not get it.  Instead Dinuzulu gave 
him a Mauser rifle and told him to return to Natal and start a rebellion, and promised support 
after it got started.108  Dinuzulu, of course, denied this. The two accounts are irreconcilable.109 
According to Mangathi (of whom more below) Bhambatha also told Dinuzulu that his tribe 
also  had  medicine  handed  down from his  forefathers  that  would  repel  the  white  man’s 
bullets, and that many other chiefs in Natal were prepared to join him in rebellion.110
It is remarkable that Bhambatha, a petty chief in Natal, dared to go to the most august 
personage in Zululand;111 more remarkable that he would go to the Osuthu without a guide,112 
and  take  along  his  pregnant  wife  and  three  children,  whom  he  left  there.   Moreover 
Bhambatha did return home with a Mauser, and two other rifles, which he had not taken with 
him, and Dinuzulu would have us believe he picked them up somewhere on his way back.113 
Nor did the great doctor materialize. A lesser one was taken back by one of Dinuzulu’s men. 
Dinuzulu would have nothing to do with the man, whose body was found several weeks later 
between the Osuthu and Mpanza.114  
106 Thompson,  Bambatha at Mpanza, 63-73 passim; “Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion”, 62; and “Collusion of 
Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, 540, 551-52.  Cf. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 281, 283-84.
107 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 74. Also, see and cf. the statement of Mankulumana, 27 April 1906, in 
AGO I/7/68 and in the records of the Prime Minister (PM) 59 463/1906, and the depositions of Ngqengqengqe, 
dated 26 March 1908 in AGO I/7/78 and 27 April 1908 in AGO I/7/70 and 1/7/79. 
108 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 64-73 passim, and see also 15 and 58; “Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion”, 
62, and “Collusion of Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, 541, 550-51.  Cf. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 166-167, 433-34; and 
Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 280-81, who sides with the Court and blames Stuart for perpetuating a falsehood.
109 It will be observed in notes 30 and 32 that the same pages are cited “passim” in Bambatha at Mpanza, which 
is because the irreconcilable accounts are juxtaposed in parallel columns.
110 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 75. Cf. statement of Mangathi, 18 December 1907 in the records of the 
Lieutenant  Governor  and  Governor  of  Natal  (GH)  1462,  and  SNA  I/6/29  and  AGO  I/7/68:  “Resume  of 
statement made by CAKIJANA at Krantzkop, on 20th May 1908 immediately prior to the reading over to him 
of the statement made by him and taken down by Mr J. S. Hedges”. The latter document (cited hereafter as 
Cakijana, “Resume”) is one of the most important sources of information on Bhambatha’s rebellion.
111 A unique hypothesis is that of Ingrid Mary Perrett, “Dinuzulu and the Bambata Rebellion” (M.A. thesis, 
University of Natal, 1960): “That the Rebellion was the result of a general rebellious spirit, and that Dinuzulu 
took advantage of the unrest, encouraged the rebels and supported them in an attempt top gain concessions and 
appointment as Paramount Chief”.  It is based on documents in the SNA, and Bhambatha is only one of many 
with whom Dinuzulu was in contact.
112 Siyikiwe said that Bhambatha had made Dinuzulu’s acquaintance at the latter’s homestead Nobamba shortly 
before the South African War,  when Bhambatha was searching for  an errant  sister and her lover,  and that 
Dinuzulu’s messenger Ngqengqengqe was their guide for  most of the way in Zululand  (Bambatha at Mpanza, 
56-57).
113 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 74-75 and 79-78 and “Collusion of Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, 544-55. Cf. 
Binns, Dinuzulu, 197.
114 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 84-86, and “Collusion of Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, 546-50.
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Rebellion at Mpanza
Bhambatha returned to Mpanza at the end of March with four guns (one of them an old shot 
gun of his own, which he had apparently left with).  He assembled the men of the Mpanza 
faction and brandished the Mauser rifle before them, saying Dinuzulu had given it to him to 
start the rebellion. Dinuzulu’s two men attested to it. One left with the ersatz doctor, and the 
other remained, ostensibly to wait for the real one, but in fact he acted as Dinuzulu’s agent 
and Bhambatha’s keeper.115  He was Sukabhekuluma kaGezindaka, a young favourite of the 
king.  He is better known in the literature by a white man’s nickname for him, Chakijana, 
after a small cunning animal in Zulu folklore.116 
Bhambatha raised an impi of about two companies, but it was obvious from the start 
that he was more interested in getting back the chieftaincy, not in fighting the poll tax.  He 
struck on the night of 2-3 April to commandeer men from the other factions and to seize his 
brother Funizwe, who had been appointed chief, and his uncle Magwababa, who had been 
appointed  regent.  Funizwe  escaped,  but  Magwababa  did  not.  Bhambatha  wanted  to  kill 
Magwababa straight  away.  It  was all  Sukabhekuluma could do to persuade him to give 
Magwababa a trial. His argument was that by killing Magwababa Bhambatha would split his 
tribe, just when it needed to be united. Magwababa was tried. Bhambatha said that he was 
guilty of conspiring with the authorities to have him deposed.  He based this charge on the 
flimsiest of hearsay.  Only one man supported Bhambatha, and then only because he was the 
chief. It was embarrassing. The men present, old and young, heard Bhambatha out, and then 
Magwababa,  the  preacher  Moses,  and  Sukabhekuluma  spoke.   The  assembly  declared 
Magwababa  innocent.   Bhambatha  went  off  and  sulked.   Magwababa  was  detained. 
Sukabhekuluma warned him that he would be killed if he tried to escape.117
Later the same morning the local magistrate and a squad of police went to Mpanza to 
find out what had happened to Magwababa. Near the Impanza hotel they were fired on and 
chased away by the  impi, which then looted the hotel. The colonial police field force was 
115 Thompson,  Bambatha at Mpanza, 83-85, 98, 110; Cf. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 168; and Marks,  Reluctant 
Rebellion, 205.
116 Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 87; Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 276n; Cf. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 176.
117 Thompson,  Bambatha at  Mpanza,  82,  86-95;  Cf.  Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion,  167-68;  and Marks,  Reluctant  
Rebellion, 205.
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dispatched to Greytown to deal with him.  But first the commander, Colonel Mansel, was 
determined to rescue the magistrate and others, including two ladies and a child who had 
been at the hotel, who were in an improvised laager at Keate’s Drift.  Bhambatha had no 
intention  of  attacking  the  place,  and  the  ladies  were  not  particularly  interested  in  being 
rescued, but the colonel did not know that, and in the afternoon of 4 April 150 police went 
down the road to Keate’s Drift, rescued the ladies, and in the evening returned to the camp. It 
was an opportunity not to be missed.  The rebels were doctored against  the white man’s 
bullets and led to the roadside, where Sukabhekuluma arranged an ambuscade.  About nine 
o’clock the police column came along.  The rebels attacked, shouting Usuthu! and throwing 
their spears. A melee ensued. The ambush in fact had miscarried.  They had attacked only the 
police advance guard, which quickly rallied and fought its way back to the main column, 
which came forward firing, and the under-gunned and undisciplined rebels fled.  The column 
closed  up  and continued  to  camp,  harassed  part  of  the  way by  snipers.  Bhambatha  and 
Sukabhekuluma  claimed  a  victory.  The  police  had  run  away  from the  battlefield.  (Four 
policemen had been killed and four had been wounded). None of the rebels had been killed. 
(Four of them had been wounded, but not seriously). The medicine had worked.118  
Bhambatha  had  defied  the  legally  constituted  government.  He  had  reclaimed  his 
chieftaincy by force, attacked the magistrate and then the police, and was now a rebel. The 
rebel force climbed to the top of Ndayi hill and waited for other rebel chiefs’ forces to arrive. 
Bhambatha sent messages to come to Gayede of the amaKhabela, Silwana of the amaChunu, 
and Nyoniyezwe of the amaBomvu. None did. The amaBomvu under the acting chief Sibindi 
helped the government, which sent militia to reinforce the police. Bhambatha now had three 
large companies, but that was not enough to defeat the forces being arrayed against him.  If 
he waited much longer he would be surrounded.  After dark on 6 April the rebels left Mpanza 
and marched by night to the Khabela location, thence on 7 April to the Thukela and crossed 
into  Zululand.   On  the  march,  half  to  two-thirds  of  the  men,  including  Magwababa, 
deserted.119
118 Thompson,  Bambatha at Mpanza, 1-7, 96-109; Cf. Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 168-77; and Marks,  Reluctant  
Rebellion, 206.  
119 Thompson,  Bambatha at  Mpanza,  95,  110-18;  “Bambatha’s  Personal  Rebellion”,  62,  and “Collusion of 
“Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, 554-55.  Cf. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 178-83; and Marks,  Reluctant Rebellion, 206-
07.
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Rebellion in Nkandla: The Usuthu Chiefs
Across the river the rebels paused to eat and rest at a homestead in Mpumela’s ward and then 
pushed on through the night and next morning to the Mhome Gorge, where they went into 
forest,  concealed  and  protected  by  Sigananda,  chief  of  the  amaChube.   Sukabhekuluma 
vouched for Bhambatha, said he had been sent by Dinuzulu to start the rebellion, and then 
went  off  to  the  Osuthu  to  report.120 Sigananda  needed  no  convincing,  but  some  of  his 
headmen did, and messengers were sent to the Osuthu to get confirmation.121 Meanwhile the 
magistrate of the Nkandla Division and the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, 
who joined him on 9 April, showered orders on local chiefs to be on guard and to catch 
Bhambatha if he came their way.122  Sigananda professed to be looking for him but unable to 
find the rebels.  Bhambatha’s force remained under wraps in the forest until 13 April, when 
Sigananda brought out Bhambatha and announced that he, too, was a rebel to an assembly of 
sympathetic leaders and their men.123 
120 RSC III/3/1 Special Court: Zulu Rebellion, “Rex vs Cakijana”, (hereafter R. v Cakijana), evidence of Burala, 
186-93, and of Cakijana 336-37. RSC III/3/2-7 Special Court: Zulu Rebellion, “Rex vs Dinuzulu” (hereafter R v 
Dinuzulu), evidence of Cakijana, 1529-35. Also, “Rex vs Sigananda”, evidence of Linyana [sic] and Polomba, 
126, MS transcript in the Colenso Collection, also in the PAR (hereafter R v Sigananda), a printed version of 
which appears in Bosman,  Natal Rebellion, Appendix III, but there are discrepancies between it and the MS, 
and the latter has been preferred in this case. See also SNA I/6/26 GH 285/1906, “Nkandhla Court Martial no. 
5” (hereafter GH 285/1906): evidence of Hlaza; and SNA I/6/27 GH 275/1906, “Nkandhla Court Martial no. 3” 
(hereafter GH 275/1906): evidence of Mgoqo. Hereafter in references to trials, “evidence of” will be dispensed 
with and only the name of the witness will be given. Cakijana, “Resume”; AGOI/7/55 “Interview (Durban 
Central  Gaol)  between  J.  S.  Hedges  and  Ndabaningi  kaSigananda  and  Lunyana,  Sigananda’s  induna,  14 
February  1907”  (hereafter,  Ndabaningi  Interview);  AGO I/7/80  “Statement  of  Burala,  24  April  1908”.  In 
references to declarations,  depositions and statements, only the name of the person making the declaration, 
deposition or statement and the date will be given. 
121 R v Sigananda: Linyana, Maginga, Mgoqo; Ndabaningi Interview; James Stuart Archives (JSA) V, 152-54: 
Nsuze.  Nsuze is an important source for Stuart, and much of his information appears in his  Zulu Rebellion 
narrative (in this instance,  196-97).  Unfortunately,  Nsuze’s statements were recorded in 1912, and Nsuze’s 
recollection is sometimes much less than perfect. 
122 Colenbrander,  “Account”,  14-16.  OD,  99, Commissioner for Native Affairs to Prime Minister (hereafter 
CNA and PM, respectively) 28 April 1906; CSO 3040, Secretary CNA to Defence, 7 April 1906, 25 and 30; 
PM 102 C226/1906 and SNA I/1/1203, Mgt Nkandhla to Minister of Native Affairs (hereafter MNA), 8 April 
1906 9.03 a.m; SNA I/1/339 1203/1906, CNA to MNA, 8 April 1906; PM 102, C230/1906, “Synopsis of Wires 
received from 6 P.M. 7/4/06 to 6 P.M. 8/4/06”, report of Mgt Nkandhla 8 April 1906, 9.30am. During the 
rebellion  synopses  of  telegrams  were  compiled  daily,  and  hereafter  will  be  cited  as  “Synopsis”  with  the 
appropriate dates.
123 Colenbrander, “Account”, 15-17;  OD, 99-101, CNA to PM, 28 April 1906; SNA I/6/27, R v Sigananda, 
Mgoqo; GH 282/1906, “Nkandhla Court Martial no. 2” (hereafter GH 282/1906): Mpikwa; JSA V, 156-60 and 
178-79: Nsuze. It should be noted that Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 198-202 misdates Sigananda’s presentation of 
Bhambatha to the rebel assembly.  His account of the doctoring which took place immediately afterward is 
unique, against which cf. ZA 23, R 25/ 1906 (Rex vs Tulwana): Mazombe.
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It  is  remarkable  that  when he  escaped  from danger  at  Mpanza,  Bhambatha  went 
straight to Sigananda. He was guided there, unhindered if not always welcomed en route. The 
evidence  is  fragmentary  and  unclear,  but  indicates  that  there  was  some  communication 
between  Dinuzulu  and  Sigananda  and  between  Bhambatha  and  Sigananda  and  probably 
between all  or some of them and other chiefs or influential  headmen before this  time.124 
Those who adhered to the rebellion in the Nkandla had a background in the Usuthu party 
which had supported Cetshwayo and Dinuzulu in the civil wars and rebellion of the 1880s.125 
They regarded the rebellion now as essentially Dinuzulu’s, not Bhambatha’s.126 They seem to 
have been primed for it; only the circumstances and timing were off. Bhambatha should have 
succeeded with this rebellion in Natal, not have failed. His sudden arrival in the Nkandla 
seems to have taken them, perhaps even Dinuzulu himself, by surprise.127
At this  juncture  Bhambatha  ceased  to  be a  leader  of  real  consequence.  His  three 
companies, depleted by desertion and probably together numbering a little over 100 men, 
were consolidated into two.128 The Nkandla contributed ten to twelve companies to the rebel 
army.129  The  camp  of  the  army,  about  a  thousand  men,  was  located,  strategically  and 
symbolically, next to Cetshwayo’s grave, near the confluence of the Nsuzi and Nkunzana 
streams.130 Bhambatha might enjoy some reputation in Natal, but not in Zululand. If he were 
124 With reference to Bhambatha in particular see Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 86, 114-16, and “Collusion 
of Bambatha and Dinuzulu”, 552-56; Perrett, “Dinuzulu and the Bambata Rebellion”, 82-83; and R v Dinuzulu, 
3033-57: Maliba (and also his statement on 26 October 1908, in the British Parliamentary Paper Command 
4194,  81-82)  and  4037-40,  4367-70,  4481,  4615,  and  Dinuzulu,  4690-92,  4852-58:  Mankulumana.   For 
circumstantial evidence see Ndabaningi Interview; ZA 34, CR18/1906, Mgt Babanango to Under Secretary for 
Native Affairs, 26 March 1906; and the Criminal Note Book (Martial Law), From no. 1/06 to 28/06, in the 
Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner, Nkandla (1/NKA), 1/5/1/1/, no. 21: Mapoyisa.
125 See  Stuart,  Zulu  Rebellion,  209-11;  Perrett,  “Dinuzulu  and the  Bambata  Rebellion”,  80-81;  and  Binns, 
Dinuzulu, 124.  For context see John Laband, The Atlas of the Later Zulu Wars 1883-1888 (Pietermaritzburg: 
University  of  Natal  Press,  2001)  passim,  and  for  “bits  and  pieces”  see  the  British  Parliamentary  Papers,  
Command 4073: 30, 66, 100, 101-02, 118-19;  4191: 30-31, 40-41, 67, 85, 91-92, 94, 95;  4214: 46-47, 64, 65, 
85;  4214: 5;  5522: 52-55.
126 Colenbrander, “Account”, 17;  OD, 102, CNA to PM, 28 April 1906;  JSA V, 153: Nsuze;  GH 282/1906: 
Mpikwa; AGO I/7/70 (and PM 104:C238/1906, which includes a précis of the statement, and SNA I/6/29): 
Mangati, 23 November 1907;  GH 1462 (and SNA I/6/29): Mangati, 18 December 1907.  
127 Cakijana, Resume.  R v Dinuzulu, 1532: Cakijana; JSA V, 152-54: Nsuze.
128 R v Dinuzulu, 1531: Cakijana; SNA I/6/27 MJC 194/1906: Gwazizulu, Magondongwana, Masimba, Mbemi, 
Mkamangana, Nogalu, Sanqawe.  See also Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza, 116.
129 The CNA estimated 12-14 companies numbering between 700 and 1000 men on 16 April (OD, 101, CNA to 
PM, 28 April 1906) and 10-13 companies on 1 May  (GH 1465, Synopsis 1/ 2 May).  The magistrate at Eshowe 
passed on a spy’s report which gave 26 companies and a detailed breakdown by tribe. See PM 102, C226/1906, 
Mgt Eshowe to PM, 6 May 1906.
130 Colenbrander, ”Account,” 17.  R v Dinuzulu, 214-15: A. W. Leslie: 1543-45: Cakijana; 3457: Colenbrander; 
SNA I/6/27 GH 289/1906, “Nkandhla Court Martial no. 7” (hereafter GH 289/1906): Muti.  GH 1462: Mangati, 
18 December 1907.
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to maintain ascendancy among the rebels, he needed to display energy and skill. He did not. 
There is very little evidence of his having addressed either the councils of war or the men of 
the  army.  He  may have  proposed  an attack  the  Nkandla  magistracy  –  a  bold  stroke 
considering its distance from the forest and favourable field of fire – before the police field 
force secured it, and the rebels did move to the edge of the forest, apparently in readiness to 
do  so,  but  the  attack  was  called  off  by  Sigananda,  who  was  still  waiting  to  hear  from 
Dinuzulu.131 Aged and infirm the old chief might be, but he was quite lucid and enjoyed the 
respect  of  the  Zulu  peoples,  which  Bhambatha  did  not,  and  therefore  he  dictated  the 
undertaking of operations.132 
The Commissioner for Native Affairs practically staked his reputation on Dinuzulu’s 
loyalty.133 Outwardly  Dinuzulu  was  loyal  and  denounced  “this  dog”  Bhambatha.   The 
government  wanted  some  token  of  proof.   The  commandant  of  militia  suggested  and 
Dinuzulu offered to lead – or since he was ill, have his principal adviser Mankulumana lead – 
his armed men to the forest and undertake Bhambatha’s capture.134 The Commissioner would 
not  have  it.  Dinuzulu’s  force  would  be  misrepresented  by  the  rebels  as  the  one  he  had 
promised. Bhambatha had told the rebels that Dinuzulu would send a force. Its presence in 
the Nkandla would create confusion, which would be to the advantage of the rebels.135  He 
prevailed upon a grumpy Dinuzulu to send Mankulumana sans army to the forest to disavow 
131 Colenbrander, “Account”, 16.  Ndabaningi Interview.   JSA V, 155-56: Nsuze.  R v Sigananda: Linyana, 
Polomba,  Simoyi;   ZA  23,  R25/1907:  Ngcubana.   SNA  I/6/27  MJC  194/1906:  Mbemi.   Statement  of 
Nongetsheni [n.d.] in the R v Sigananda file of the Colenso Collection.
132 1/NKA 3/2/1/2, Report of the Magistrate of Nkandhla Division in reply to Circular CNA no. 17/1906 [and] 
SNA Circular  no.  11/1906, 23 July 1906;   OD, 98 and 103,  CNA to PM, 28 April  1906;  Bosman,  Natal 
Rebellion, 109-10;  Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 202 and 211;  R v Cakijana, 125: Bova; 241, 249: Ndabazezwe.
133 OD, 28, Governor to Secretary of State, 23 February 1906; 76, Governor to Secretary of State, 20 April 
1906; 99, CNA to PM, 28 April  1906; GH 1465 80, CNA’s Report, 14 April 1906, quoted in Minister of 
Defence to Governor, 16 April 1906.  Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 105-06.  Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 213.
134 OD, 77, [Dinuzulu to CNA, n.d.] and 102, CNA to PM, 28 April 1906.  CSO 3040, CNA to PM 20 April 
1906: 21.45; GH 1465 84, Commandant of Militia to Governor, 19 April 1906, and 93; Synopsis 18/19 April, 
CNA’S report 18 April 1906; R v Dinuzulu, 4489: Dinuzulu, and 4703: Mankulumana.
135 OD, 76, Governor to Secretary of State, 20 April 1906 and 102, CNA to PM, 28 April 1906;  CSO 3040, 
CNA to PM, 17 April 1906; GH 1465 87, Commandant of Militia to Governor, 17 April 1906 and 85, Synopsis 
16/17 April,  CNA’s  Reports  16 April  1906,  and 93,  Synopsis  18/19 April,  CNA’s  Report  18 April  1906. 
Mankulumana states  that  he was opposed to sending a force  in R v Dinuzulu,  4702. On the CNA’s fears 
possibly having some foundation, see R v Dinuzulu, 1180, 1231, 1466, A. G. Daniels.  The CNA was also 
opposed to Dinuzulu’a addressing loyal levies as it would give him undue authority (cf. Perrett’s thesis).  CSO 
3040 and PM 102, C228/1906, CNA to PM, 5 June 1906 (and, in ZA 28) the same to the Officer Commanding, 
Zululand Field Force.  See also SNA I/1/343, 1856/1906, “Notes on Interview between H E the Governor and 
the Envoys from Dinuzulu at Government House on 20h June 1906” (hereafter, Government House Interview).
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the  rebels  and  to  demand  the  surrender  of  Bhambatha.136 There  is  evidence  that 
Mankulumana was delayed in order to allow Sigananda’s messengers time to get back to the 
Nkandla before him.137
Mankulumana played his role well. On 25 April he told an assembly of rebels, led by 
Sigananda’s  son  and  heir  Ndabaningi,  the  Ntuli  rebel  leader  Mangathi,  and  also 
Sukabhekuluma (who had returned from the Osuthu),  that  Dinuzulu disavowed them and 
resented their using his name in connexion with Bhambatha.  He also made it plain that he 
was sent to them at the behest of the government rather than Dinuzulu.138 He had a message 
which he was to give only to Sigananda, but by design he was not allowed to talk to either 
Sigananda  or  Bhambatha.    Sigananda’s  messengers  had returned  from the  Osuthu  with 
instructions that they should not meet him.139 Moreover Sukabhekuluma and his uncle Yena 
had returned to the Nkandla with affirmations of Dinuzulu’s support.140 Yet there is evidence 
136 R v Dinuzulu, 1249-55: A. G. Daniels, 3533-57: G. W. Armstrong; 4053, 4055, 4488, 4492: Dinuzulu: 4703-
05:  Mankulumana;  and  AGO I/7/78,  “Notes  of  further  interview between  HE the  Governor  and  Anthony 
Gideon Daniels at Government House 24 December 1906”; and I/7/75, “Statement by Anthony Gideon Daniels 
before T. R. Bennett, the Pietermaritzburg Central Gaol, 18 March 1908” (cf. I/7/55, where a typescript is dated 
23 March 1908).
137 R v Dinuzulu, 4054, 4483, 4485: Dinuzulu; 4706, 4854: Mankulumana; Government House Interview; JSA 
V,  156:  Nsuze;  AGO  I/7/78,  “Governor’s  interview  with  Daniels”,  24  December  1906;  R  v  Sigananda: 
Polomba.   On a possible  third  messenger,  sent  specially  by  Dinuzulu to  Sigananda,  see  R v  Sigananada: 
Maginga.
138 R v Dinuzulu, 2790-2791, 2829: Mangati; 4708-20, 4825-54: Mankulumana; 5191-5207: Nopungwa; 5228-
31: Godi.  R v Cakijana, 344-46: Cakijana; R v Sigananda,: Linyana, Maginga, Polomba, Simoyi; Government 
House Interview; Ndabaningi Interview; AGO I/7/68 (and PM 59 463/1906): Mankulumana, 27 April 1906. 
Mankulumana went to the forest on 23 April and returned from it on 27 April 1906.  The evidence on his 
mission may be divided  into four  categories,  in  chronological  order:  and a  “government”  version  (“early” 
Mankulumana, with an official gloss); a “rebel” version (Ndabaningi and Sigananda’s headmen), a “renegade” 
version (Mangathi and Sukabhekuluma); and a “royal” version (Dinuzulu and Mankulumana and the Osuthu 
dependants).
139 The public message was similar to that Mankulumana gave, and the secret message was that Dinuzulu was 
sympathetic, but Mankulumana should not see Sigananda or Bhambatha. JSA V, 156: Nsuze; and Stuart, Zulu 
Rebellion, 203;  R  v  Sigananda:  Maginga,  Mgoqo,  Ndabaningi;  Cakijana,  “Resume”;  R  v  Cakijana,  1816: 
Cakijana.  For the fall-out from this see R v Dinuzulu, 2637-38: Langalibomvu; 2784, 2790-91, 2832: Mangati; 
4713: Mankulumana; AGO I/7/68, Mankulumana, 27 April 1906; Government House Interview;  GH 1462: 
Mangati, 18 December 1907; and GH 289/1906: Lunyana; and R v Sigananda: Polomba.  Mankulumana’s two-
facedness in this affair seems to have been appreciated readily by the rebel leaders, but not, of course, by their 
followers.
140 Sukabhekuluma had returned to the Nkandla from the Osuthu on or about 18 April, and rejoined Bhambatha. 
He reported that Dinuzulu was coming, but not yet.  His usefulness to Dinuzulu was at an end, because he had 
been identified by name by the authorities.  AGO I/7/70 (and 79): Ngqengqengqe, 27 April 1908; and I/7/66: R 
v Cakijana: Cakijana; R v Dinuzulu, 1921: Cakijana.   Mangathi observed that Mankulumana was not surprised 
to see Sukabhekuluma at the assembly on 25 April—see GH 1462, 18 December 1907—although Lunyana (R v 
Sigananda) states that Sukabhekuluma was not there.  Sukabhekuluma’s uncle Yena, an elusive and evasive 
figure, returned from the Osuthu on or about 16 April and also reported, but his message, although evidently 
encouraging, is not given.  Cakijana, “Resume”; SNA I/6/29 CR 137/1907, Mangati, 26 November 1907. 
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that  suggests  that  Mankulumana  had  secret  talks  with  Sigananda  and with  Bhambatha’s 
officer  Mkamangana  and  preacher  Moses.141  On  his  return  from the  forest  he  told  the 
Commissioner that he had made no headway with the rebels.142 
Not surprisingly, instead of discouraging the rebels, as the Commissioner wistfully 
reported, Mankulumana’s mission seemed to encourage them.143 They became aggressive in 
raiding  neighbouring  chiefdoms  which  remained  loyal  to  the  government.144 The  chiefs 
Ndube, and later on, Mpumela and Mbuzo, who had hesitated while most of their tribesmen 
joined the rebels, sought the protection of the government.145 
Bhobe: The Discredit of Bhambatha
Meanwhile the government sent police and militia to the Nkandla. These forces secured the 
magistracy  and also took position at  Fort  Yolland and Ntingwe. Thus they restricted  the 
rebels’ area of operations and seized the strategic initiative.146 On 5 May Colonel Mansel 
made a reconnaissance in force towards the rebel base, and the force there sallied to meet it. 
Bhambatha argued for an attack in the bush and not in the open, but evidently Sigananda 
(and Sukabhekuluma) did not agree with him.  The enemy was coming down the bare spine 
141 In the case of Sigananda it seems less than likely (see R v Dinuzulu, 2639-2641: Langalibomvu, and 5095-
5099: Gcoyane), but in the case of Bhambatha’s men, rather more likely.  See R v Sigananda: Maginga, Mgoqo, 
but cf. Polomba (who denies flatly) and Linyana and Simoyi (who hedge); AGO I/7/54 and 70: Ngoqo, 6 April 
1908; Cakijana, “Resume”; and R v Cakijana, 344-345: Cakijana.
142 Mankulumana’s statement, 27 April 1906, taken down by Stuart, is in AGO I/7/68 and PM 59  463/1906. See 
also GH 1465 112: Synopsis 26/27 April, CNA’s Report, 27 April 1906; Colenbrander, “Account”, 17-18; R v 
Dinuzulu, 3481: Colenbrander.
143 The CNA reported that Mankulumana’s mission had a discouraging effect (OD, 102, 28 April 1906, and 115, 
8  May 1906),  but  the magistrate  thought quite  otherwise (R v Dinuzulu,  3484: Colenbrander),  and events 
immediately following bear him out.  See also ZA 34 CR 24/1906, Mgt Emtonjaneni to CNA, 15 May 1906; 
and PM 102 C226/1906 (also quoted in GH 1465, 114, Synopsis 27/28 April), Mgt Eshowe to PM, 27 April 
1906, 16.55; and R v Sigananda: Mgoqo.
144 GH 1465 117: Synopsis 29/30 April, Reports of the Officer Commanding, Umvoti Field Force, 29 April: 
17.00, Intelligence, Krantzkop, 30 April: 15.30, CNA, 29 April: 21.20, Mgt Eshowe 30 April 1906: 10.30, and 
Mgt Krantzkop [n.d.]; 142; and Synopsis 13/14 April 1906, OC Troops, Eshowe, to Defence, 11 May 1906: 
21.40; and 146: as well as Synopsis 13/14 May 1906, OC UFF, 14 May 1906. Also CSO 2599 C147/1906, 
Umvoti Field Force Diary, 28-30 April 1906, and 3040: Mgt Eshowe to PM, 30 April: 13.08, and 14 May 1906: 
17.15; and Natal Witness, “Rebels Looting”, 5 May 1906. 
145 Ndube fled on the night of 22-23 April.  GH 275/1906: Ndube.  GH 1465, 103: Synopsis 22/23 April, reports  
of OC UFF 12.50 and CNA [n.d.]; JSA, I, 164-65: Hayiyana.  Mbuzo fled on 13 May; GH 1465, 146: Synopsis 
13/14 May, OC UFF’s Report 14 May 1906; and 151: Synopsis 17/18 April: Magistrate Krantzkop’s Report 18 
May 1906.  Mpumela fled on 14 May.  See GH 1465, 148: Synopsis 15/16 May, Reports of OC UFF 13 May 
and Intelligence Krantzkop 15 May 1906; and CSO 3040, Mgt Krantzkop to PM, 16 May 1906: 17.10.
146 See Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 216-219, and Thompson, Historical Atlas, 18-21.
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of Bhobe ridge towards the grave. He was in the open and had to be stopped there: the rebels 
could not choose their ground.  It was a hot day, and the enemy column was strung out after a 
hard  march.   It  might  be  defeated  in  detail.  Sigananda’s  and  Ndube’s  men  (probably 
commanded by Ndabaningi  and Macwaneka,  respectively),  were concealed in the rugged 
features of the ground.  They charged only when they were discovered by the enemy’s van. 
They showed great dash, but the enemy quickly formed and repelled them with rifle fire. 
After about twenty minutes trying to get hand-to-hand with him, they broke and fled down 
the slopes of the ridge. Meanwhile Bhambatha led his men through bush along the Nkunzana 
to flank or turn the enemy column on the left. The enemy at the rear perceived this movement 
and opened fire at long range. After firing a few shots in reply,  Bhambatha’s companies 
retreated. The enemy column closed up, but, instead of proceeding towards the grave, turned 
aside and marched back to Fort Yolland.147   
The battle of Bhobe ridge was a turning point in the rebellion.148 The rebels claimed 
that the enemy had run away and left them in possession of the battlefield, just as at Mpanza. 
But this time they had suffered heavy losses – between sixty and seventy killed and many 
more wounded.149 Bhambatha’s medicine did not work.  His doctors had failed.  Bhambatha 
argued that Sigananda’s men had spoilt the medicine by sleeping and having sex with their 
wives and sweethearts  after  they had been doctored.   He also blamed them for their  bad 
tactics.150  His men had suffered no casualties whatever, because they did not engage at all. 
147 For  attempts to describe the action from both sides see Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion,  230-35, and Thompson, 
Historical  Atlas,  22-23.   For  the  reports  of  the Natal  Police  Commander  Colonel  Mansel  see  CSO 2599, 
C147/1906, Colonel McKenzie’s report which incorporates Mansel’s, and the separate Diary of the Natal Police 
Reserve Force; and 3040 (and GH 1465 132), Mansel to Defence, 6 May 1906. The colonial side is dealt with in 
Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 31-33; H. P. Holt, The Mounted Police of Natal (London, Murray, 1913), 203-08; A. 
H. G. Blamey,  My Verulam Troop (Umzumbi: private, 1954), 15-24; and Ethel Campbell,  The Life of Sam 
Campbell (Durban: private, 1933), 263-64.  Also  see Natal Mercury, “The Nkomo fight”, 9 May, 1906 and 
“Nkandhla News”, 12 May 1906. The rebel side may be reconstructed from extensive but fragmentary evidence 
in Cakijana, “Resume”;  R v Cakijana, 125-26: Bova; 140: Baletshe; as well as the MS transcripts in AGO 
I/7/58 and 66, for Bova and Cakijana, respectively; R v Dinuzulu, 1545, 1827-29: Cakijana, and 2792: Mangati; 
R v Sigananda: Ndabaningi and Polomba; GH 275/1906: Dunga; GH 282/1906: Polomba.; GH 289/1906: Muti; 
GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29: Mangati, 18 December 1907; AGO I/7/80: Baletshe, 24 March 1908, and Msolwa, 8 
April 1908; SNA I/6/27, MJC 194/1906: Mpetempete, Nogalaju, Sikukula; and the Archives of the Magistrate 
and Commissioner, Weenen (hereafter 1/WEN) 1/4/21, “Martial Law. Note Book”, no. 20/1906: Mcitsho.
148 Colenbrander, “Account”, 19-20; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 235; Natal Mercury, “Natives Surrendering”, 7 May 
1906; and R v Sigananda: Mgoqo.
149 This is the police estimate. See CSO 2599 C147/1906, Natal Police Diary.  Others range between 50 and 100 
killed.  A very conservative estimate based on eight rebel sources gives at least 47 killed.
150 JSA V,  178-79:  Nsuze;  GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29:  Mangati,  18 December  1907;  R v Dinuzulu,  2792: 
Mangati.  Sigananda sent messengers to Dinuzulu, who blamed the defeat on the sally in the open.  See R v 
Sigananda: Mgoqo, Ndabaningi, and Polomba.
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Sigananda’s people were angry.  It appeared that Bhambatha had deceived them and fought 
shy of the battle. The women threatened him.  Fearing for his life, Bhambatha hastened to 
Macala  hill,  where  Mangathi’s  force  was  based.151 Sukabhekuluma accompanied  him,  of 
course. Bhambatha became ill – Sukabhekuluma said he had a stitch in his side – and for 
nearly a fortnight he remained secluded in the hut which Mangathi allotted him.152   
Manifestly  Bhambatha  was a flawed leader.   First,  he had turned the rebellion at 
Mpanza into a personal vendetta, and had to be checked by Sukabekhuluma. Second, he had 
failed to enlist the majority of his tribe in the rebellion, and failed to get the support expected 
of other chiefs in Natal.  Third, at the battle of Bhobe, his medicine did not work and he 
himself did not fight, so that he looked like a liar and a coward, and then he had left his own 
men in the Nkandla153 for the more hospitable camp of Mangathi. He was little more than a 
tarnished symbol.  He no longer commanded anyone.  Friend and foe might still conjure with 
his name, but he no longer influenced operations. There is no report of him in the subsequent 
fighting at Dlolwana, Msukana and Silokomane.  
The government build-up continued.  The government  manifestly had the men, the 
guns, the force and the will to win. The rebels looked in vain for help from Dinuzulu.154 They 
began to  lose more adherents  than they attracted.155 Chiefs like Gayede,  Hlangabeza and 
Thulwana, who had been “chewing with both jaws”, stopped and came down squarely on the 
winning side.156  Colonel Duncan McKenzie arrived at the Nkandla magistracy in command 
151 JSA II, 203: Mangati, and V, 178-79: Nsuze; and Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 236.
152 JSA V, 160-61: Nsuze;  GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29: Mangati,  18 December 1907; R v Cakijana,  346-47: 
Cakijana; R v Dinuzulu, 1547, 1827-28: Cakijana; R v Sigananda: Mgoqo, Ndabaningi.
153 Colenbrander, “Account”, 20; JSA V, 161: Nsuze; R v Cakijana, 126: Bova; R v Dinuzulu, 1547: Cakijana.
154 See P. S. Thompson, “Crossroads of War: The People of Nkandla in the Zulu Rebellion of 1906”, Scientia  
Militaria 35, no. 2, 2007, 105-06.  Dinuzulu and others at the Osuthu were distracted and embarrassed at this 
time by a scare that a government force was descending on the Osuthu and by the murder of the Mahlabatini 
magistrate  H.  M. Stainbank on 3 May. See Colenbrander,  “Account”,  19;   Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion,  219-21; 
Marks,  Reluctant Rebellion, 254 and 298-99; R v Dinuzulu, 1291: A. G. Daniels; GH 1286, 98-113, CNA to 
PM, 11 September 1906; SNA I/4/22, C22/1909, “General Report on the Stainbank Murder”; AGO I/7/54, Mgt 
Mahlabatini to Attorney-General, “Précis of evidence and copies of depositions”; and ZA 28, R v Umpeta and 
others”, 22 August 1908.
155 Colenbrander, “Account”, 19-20; Natal Mercury, “Natives Surrendering”, 7 May 1906; GH 1462 (and SNA 
I/6/29): Mlonyeni, 6 December 1907 and 1465, 134: Synopsis 7/8 May: Intelligence Krantzkop’s Report, 8 May 
1906, and 138: Synopsis 9/10 May: Reports of Intelligence Krantzkop and Chief Commissioner of Police, Fort 
Yolland  [n.d.];   SNA  I/6/27:  MJC  194/1906:  Sofuguza;  Archives  of  the  Magistrate  Greytown  (1/GTN) 
1/3/2/1,“Cases tried under Martial Law at Magistrate’s office, Greytown 1906”, no. 12: Madolo, Umtshekula, 
Umgwempisi, Umziki, Umpendu, Ujoni, Mazikwempi.
156 SNA I/1/342, 1684/1906, Report of the Chief Intelligence Officer, Umvoti Field Force, Krantzkop, 27 May 
1906, on Amakabela tribe; GH 285/1906: Nongqai; 1/NKA 1/5/1/1, no. 11: Tulwana (Mtshule) and 2, no. 39: 
Nqakamatshe;  ZA 23,  R 25/1907,  Makula,  Maxibane,  Mcetshwa,  Mfokazi,  Sambana;  and  Natal Mercury, 
“Krantzkop Rumours”, 10 May 1906:
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of the Zululand Field Force.  Across the Thukela was the Umvoti Field Force under Colonel 
George Leuchars. On 17 May these forces converged on the rebel base at Cetshwayo’s grave. 
The rebels were surprised and fled, and their camp was destroyed.157 Only Mangathi showed 
fight, but he failed to cut off the rearguard of one column at Msukana and then to draw the 
van of another at Silokomane,158 where incidentally Sukabhekuluma was wounded and put 
out of action for a fortnight.159  
Sigananda now proposed to surrender, and an armistice was granted so that he could 
arrange the matter with his people. After five days the armistice expired and there was no 
surrender.160 On 21 May a column destroyed Mangathi’s  camp at  Macala  Hill.  Mangathi 
prudently withdrew ahead of it to a new camp in the Ekombe forest, on the Qudeni range.161
Revival of Rebel Fortunes
By this time Bhambatha had recovered, and he and Mangathi went to the Osuthu to find out 
what was keeping Dinuzulu.162 According to Mangathi, he himself did most of the talking. 
Bhambatha complained about Sigananda’s losing at Bhobe and asked Dinuzulu to appoint 
some able leaders.163 He also visited his wife and children.164 Bhambatha and Mangathi were 
there three days, and Dinuzulu told them to go and join Mehlokazulu, a prominent chief in 
157 Colenbrander,  “Account”,  21-22;  Bosman,  Natal  Rebellion,  37-43;  Stuart,  Zulu  Rebellion,  237-43; 
Thompson, Historical Atlas, 24-25.
158 GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29: Mangati, 18 December 1907; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 241-42; W. J. Powell, The 
Zulu Rebellion of 1906: A Souvenir of the Transvaal Mounted Rifles (Johannesburg, Transvaal Leader, 1906), 
29, 31-32.  
159 Cakijana, “Resume”; R v Cakijana, 147: Msolwa, and 347-348: Cakijana; PM 104, C238/1907, Mangati, 23 
November 1907; AGO I/7/80: Mangati, 27 March 1908; SNA I/6/27: MJC 194/1906, Mpetempete.
160 Colenbrander, “Account”, 22-23; Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 47-52 passim; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 245-49.
161 Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 49-50; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 246; GH 1466, 4: Synopsis 24/25 May 1906, Report 
of R. H. Addison [n.d.]; Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner Babanango (1/BGO) 1/4/1/1, “Native 
Rebellion. Note Book 1906” 1/8/1: Kawulana.
162 Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 313-14; Marks,  Reluctant Rebellion, 216-17. Mangathi is the chief informant with 
regard to this visit, but there are significant differences between his depositions and trial evidence. See PM 104, 
C238/1906, 23 November 1907; GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29, 18 December 1907; AGO I/7/54, 8 November 1908; 
R v Cakijana, 160-63; R v Dinuzulu. 2793-2804, 2810-12, 2834-36, 2839-47, 2869-70.   
163 AGO I/7/54: Mangati, 8 November 1908; R v Dinuzulu, 2975-78 and 2800-02: Mangati.
164 SNA I/6/29, Depositions of Siyekiwe, 5 and 12 July and 23 December 1907; of Kolekile, 13 September and 
24 December 1907, and Ndabayake, 19 July 1907;  R v Dinuzulu, 254-59 and 313: Siyekiwe; 361-65, Kolekile; 
451-53: Ndabayake. See also PM 104, C238/1907, Mangati 23 November 1907; GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29: 
Mangati, 18 December 1907; R v Cakijana, 165: Mangati.   
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the Nqutu Division who had rebelled.165 Mangathi says that Bhambatha did not want to return 
to the fighting and he had to force him to go back.166  On trial Dinuzulu admitted to one brief 
interview with Mangathi, whom he scolded for bothering him and then sent packing; but he 
did not have him arrested.  He denied absolutely that Bhambatha was there at all.167
By the beginning of June the strategic situation had altered radically, and Dinuzulu 
might well have looked forward to a change of fortunes.  Mehlokazulu’s army was composed 
of nine to fourteen companies from various chiefdoms of the Nqutu and Umsinga divisions 
which  had  gone  over  to  rebellion  very  belatedly,  thanks  to  confused  and  ineffectual 
leadership,  typified  by  Mehlokazulu  himself.168 Different  portions  of  his  force  had  had 
disastrous encounters with government forces at Elandskraal on 12 May and Mpukunyoni on 
28 May, and they had no illusions about the white man and his bullets.  Mehlokazulu moved 
towards the Nkandla to avoid a government field force operating near Isandlwana. His impi 
and those of  Mangathi  and Sigananda (including  Bhambatha’s  lot)  came together  in  the 
Ekombe.169  The combined forces numbered perhaps thirty-five to forty companies, with a 
strength of between twelve and fifteen hundred men.170 It moved down to the Thukela, as if 
165 PM 104, C238/1907, Mangati, 23 November 1907; GH 1462 and SNA I/6/29: Mangati, 18 December 1907; 
AGO I/7/54: Mangati, 8 November 1908; SNA I/6/29: Siyekiwe, 12 July and 23 December 1907; R v Dinuzulu, 
2798-2800 and 2834-36: Mangati; R v Sigananda: Polomba; Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 285-86.
166 R v Dinuzulu, 2820 and 2828-29: Mangati.
167 R v Dinuzulu, 4072-74, 4227, 4230-4232, 4239-43, 4442-45, 4451-53, 4455-62: Dinuzulu; 4728-31, 4840-
42, 4883-89: Mankulumana.  See also the supporting evidence of Njinjini, in ibid., 5259, 5243-44, 5271-76; R v 
Sigananda; and AGO I/7/70, 27 November 1907.  The Court seems to have been inclined to believe Dinuzulu, 
and reluctantly accepted the disparate evidence of Mangathi, Siyekiwe and others – see Trial of Dinuzulu, viii-
ix,  xiv-xv,  25,  67,  79-83.  Yet  apart  from  their  evidence,  there  is  circumstantial  and  peripheral  evidence 
supporting Bhambatha’s being at the Osuthu.  See and cf. the following:  GH 1465 154: Synopsis 20/21 May, 
Intelligence Krantzkop’s report [n.d.], and 1466 2: Synopsis 23/24 May, reports of OC UFF and Intelligence 
Krantzkop [n.d.], and 1466 12: Synopsis 26/27 May, OC UFF report 26 May 1906: 11.00;  Natal Mercury, 
“Bambata’s Whereabouts”, 28 May 1906, and Times of Natal,  “Gone North”, 28 May 1906; OD, 145, CNA to 
PM, 29 May 1906; SNA I/1/344, 2051/1906: Muziwaka, 27 June 1906;  R v Dinuzulu, 737-38: Mahayihayi; 
1194-99: Daniels; 6113-15: Okalingenisa; AGO I/7/76: Sicoto, 24 May 1908.   
168 Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 266-67 and 277-78; Marks,  Reluctant Rebellion, 222; Thompson,  Historical Atlas, 
28-29 and 34-35.  See estimates of strength in GH 1466, 35: Synopsis 30/31 May, OC UFF Report 31 May 
1906, and 38: Synopsis 31 May/1 June, CNA’s Report 31 May 1906, citing Mpikwa, and OC ZFF report 31 
May 1906; also Powell, Zulu Rebellion, 42. 
169 Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 266-79 and 319-28; Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 56-59; Thompson, Historical Atlas, 20-
34  passim.
170 The strength of the force is a subject of much conjecture, owing to many different reports at the time. The 
figures here are from GH 1466, 32-33: Synopsis 30/31 May, OC UFF Report 31 May 1906, and 38: Synopsis 
31 May/1 June, CNA’s report 31 May 1906; and OD, 161, CNA to PM, 1 June 1906.
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to  invade  Natal,  then  moved  to  the  Macala,  and  finally  shifted  to  the  East.171 The 
Emtonjaneni and Eshowe divisions were agog with rumours of an imminent general rising.172
 Mangathi announced to the  impi that Dinuzulu had appointed Macala, a leader of 
Ndube’s  rebels,  as  supreme  commander,  and  Mganu,  one  of  Sigananda’s  headmen  to 
command the Mavalana  ibutho, an age set of young men recently embodied by Dinuzulu. 
Mangathi also said that Bhambatha and he had been made princes.173 Bhambatha rode with 
the leaders of the army, but he seems to have had no input in their councils. The defects of 
rebel leadership may have been rectified in respect of Sigananda’s and Mangathi’s units, but 
not  for  Mehlokazulu’s  and  such  was  Mehlokazulu’s  reputation  that  he  dominated  the 
councils.174  
It is not clear what the rebel leaders intended. Sigananda’s people had suffered greatly 
from  a  series  of  “drives”  by  McKenzie’s  troops,  which  had  destroyed  homesteads  and 
captured livestock.175 Sigananda called on the army for help.176 It has been suggested that the 
army would go to the Mhome gorge and lie in wait to ambush the government forces in the 
forests there, although this would be playing old tactics and it is doubtful that food would be 
sufficient to sustain it.177 Other evidence suggests that the army was indeed heading eastward, 
in which case it would most likely support a rising there.178  
Defeat, Death, and Apotheosis
171 Thompson, Historical Atlas, 34-37, and “Crossroads of War”, 117-18; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 314-15, suffers 
because of Nsuze’s confusion about the timing of the demonstration at the Thukela misdating (see JSA V, 161).
172 ZA 28, CNA to OC ZFF, 2 June 1906, and to PM, 12 June 1906, and 34, CR 29/1906, Mgt Empangeni to 
CNA,  13 June  1906;  CSO 3040,  Mgt  Eshowe to  PM,  25 June  1906:  17.40;  Cakijana,  “Resume”;   Natal 
Mercury,  “The  Illusive  Bambata”,  6  June,  and  “Native  Rebellion”,  9  June  1906;  Natal  Witness,  “Rebel 
Opinions: Strange Thesis”, 9 June 1906; and Times of Natal, “Natal Parliament. Legislative Assembly. Zululand 
Rumours”, 7 June 1906.
173 Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion,  314, based upon Nsuze in  JSA V, 162; Cakijana,  “Resume”; R v Cakijana,  349: 
Cakijana.
174 PM 104 C238/1907, Mangati, 23 November 1907; R v Dinuzulu, 1776: Cakijana, and 2691: Mazwi; SNA 
I/6/27  MJC 194/1906, Nkonywana; R v Sigananda: Ndabaningi.
175 Bosman,  Natal Rebellion, 60-77; Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 251-55; Thompson,  Historical Atlas, 31-33, and 
“Crossroads of War”, 110-16.
176 Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 314-15, based on Nsuze in JSA V, 161; Thompson, “Crossroads of War”, 118.
177 Colenbrander, “Account”, 29; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 297-98; Thompson, “Crossroads of War”, 118-19.
178 Thompson, “Crossroads of War”, 118.
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The army arrived at the mouth of the Mhome gorge after a long and tiring march on the 
evening  of  9  June,  and  bivouacked  without  throwing  out  sentries.179 Sukabhekuluma, 
recovered from his wound, smelt a rat and joined a lone company which remained at the 
Macala.180 In the course of the night there were intimations of the enemy’s approach, and 
Mangathi  and  then  Ndabaningi  took  their  followers  into  the  gorge  for  safety,  but 
Mehlokazulu dismissed the reports, and Bhambatha stuck with him. Too late did they realize 
their error. At dawn the enemy opened a murderous fire and cut off escape up the gorge. 
Nothing is said of Mehlozkazulu in all this, but there is a report that Bhambatha panicked, 
and that Mganu took charge and tried to retrieve the situation with a futile charge which 
broke up under the heavy fire. Those who managed to flee from the mouth of the gorge took 
refuge in a small forest just above it and were hunted down in the afternoon. About 500 men 
died in the massacre, including Bhambatha and Mehlokazulu.181
The  rebellion  in  the  Nkandla  collapsed  as  a  result.  Sigananda  and  Ndabaningi 
surrendered  a  few days  later,  and  most  of  the  surviving  rebels  followed  their  example. 
Mangathi and Sukabhekuluma became fugitives.182 Militia intelligence identified a body in 
the gorge as Bhambatha’s.  The head was cut off and brought to the camp, where it  was 
shown  to  those  who  would  recognize  it.  The  intention  was  to  pre-empt  stories  that 
Bhambatha had run away to fight another day. Ndabaningi and others saw the head and said 
it was Bhambatha’s, and it was good enough Bhambatha’s for the time being. After two days 
it was returned to the body in the gorge and buried with it.183
In the unsettled times after  the rebellion reports  did circulate  that  Bhambatha had 
escaped and was preparing to renew the fight, but no witness ever appeared who had actually 
seen him. Mangathi and Sukabekuluma believed he was dead. Dinuzulu told Siyekiwe that 
her  husband  was  dead,  but,  of  course,  he  was  in  no  position  to  make  a  definitive 
pronouncement. If anyone wanted Bhambatha out of the way, it would be Dinuzulu. Dead 
179 Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 315-16.
180 Cakijana,  “Resume”; R v Cakijana,  349-350: Cakijana; R v Dinuzulu, 1777-78: Cakijana;  AGO I/7/54: 
Tshwapana, 20 December 1908.
181 Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 78-94; Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 299-313 and 315-17; Thompson, Historical Atlas, 
36 and 38-39.
182 Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 105-10; Stuart,  Zulu Rebellion, 333-35; Thompson,  Historical Atlas, 36-37; PM 
104, C238/1907, Mangati, 23 November 1907;  Cakijana, “Resume”. 
183 Bosman, Natal Rebellion, 107-08; Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, 336-38; P. S. Thompson, “Bambatha after Mome: 
Dead or Alive?”  Historia 50, no. 1, May 2005, 23-31. See Guy,  Remembering the Rebellion,  129-131, for 
photographs said to be Bhambatha’s head. 
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men tell no tales. After Dinuzulu was arrested for complicity in the rebellion, at the end of 
1907, the stories about Bhambatha tailed off.184
Thus the career of the rebel leader Bhambatha kaMancinza. Heritage and History are 
distinct entities, and there are two Bhambathas. One is the icon of the centenary celebrations. 
The other is the mortal in the historical evidence. It has been the purpose of this article to 
describe Bhambatha’s career as a rebel leader.  Its thesis is that he was a weak leader, who 
had to be kept to his duty by others, notably Sukabhekuluma and Mangathi. He mishandled 
the rebellion at Mpanza, and lost control of it in Nkandla. He had rivals for command there, 
of course, but he had a high reputation, at least initially. He seems to have lost that, too, at 
Bhobe.
Bhambatha’s story is a tragic one, of an unhappy, unstable man driven to recklessness 
and  to  danger.  The  centenary  celebrations  made  him out  to  be  a  hero  and  a  martyr.  If 
anything  he  was  a  hapless  victim  of  circumstances.  He  displayed  none  of  the  courage 
associated with heroes.  He appears to have been the tool of someone at the Osuthu – it is 
very tempting to say that it was Dinuzulu, but we cannot be sure it was he – and during the 
rebellion he was very much in the hands of Sukabhekuluma, and, after Sukabhekuluma was 
wounded, the dependant of Mangathi. It may be called Bhambatha’s rebellion,  but to the 
rebels themselves it was really Dinuzulu’s rebellion.
184 Thompson, “Bambatha after Mome”, 32-34.
